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authorMartin Fischer <martin@push-f.com>2021-04-09 14:23:14 +0200
committerMartin Fischer <martin@push-f.com>2021-04-09 14:28:25 +0200
commitf755eb02b4be1a2d97941f15c776d2391420ecad (patch)
tree48d4cab357e11cacf7de4a0546f1cae3db5a6382 /src/security
parent61d8ccaddde9ce3f50d11daa706e0c93f70a3cd4 (diff)
make security module optional
Diffstat (limited to 'src/security')
-rw-r--r--src/security/signed.rs72
1 files changed, 72 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/security/signed.rs b/src/security/signed.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4da6760
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/security/signed.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+use hmac::{Hmac,NewMac,Mac};
+use sha2::Sha256;
+
+const SIGNED_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
+const BASE64_DIGEST_LEN: usize = 44;
+
+/// A convenience wrapper around HMAC.
+///
+/// This code was adapted from the [`cookie`] crate which does not make the sign and verify functions public
+/// forcing the use of [`CookieJar`](cookie::CookieJar)s, which are akward to work with without a high-level framework.
+// Thanks to Sergio Benitez for writing the original code and releasing it under MIT!
+pub struct Key (pub [u8; SIGNED_KEY_LEN]);
+
+impl Key {
+ const fn zero() -> Self {
+ Key ( [0; SIGNED_KEY_LEN])
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to generate signing/encryption keys from a secure, random
+ /// source. Keys are generated nondeterministically. If randomness cannot be
+ /// retrieved from the underlying operating system, returns `None`.
+ pub fn try_generate() -> Option<Key> {
+ use rand::RngCore;
+
+ let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+ let mut both_keys = [0; SIGNED_KEY_LEN];
+ rng.try_fill_bytes(&mut both_keys).ok()?;
+ Some(Key::from(&both_keys))
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a new Key from a 32 byte cryptographically random string.
+ pub fn from(key: &[u8]) -> Key {
+ if key.len() < SIGNED_KEY_LEN {
+ panic!("bad key length: expected >= 32 bytes, found {}", key.len());
+ }
+
+ let mut output = Key::zero();
+ output.0.copy_from_slice(&key[..SIGNED_KEY_LEN]);
+ output
+ }
+
+ /// Signs the value providing integrity and authenticity.
+ pub fn sign(&self, value: &str) -> String {
+ // Compute HMAC-SHA256 of the cookie's value.
+ let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&self.0).expect("good key");
+ mac.update(value.as_bytes());
+
+ // Cookie's new value is [MAC | original-value].
+ let mut new_value = base64::encode(&mac.finalize().into_bytes());
+ new_value.push_str(value);
+ new_value
+ }
+
+ /// Extracts the value from a string signed with [`Key::sign`].
+ /// Fails if the string is malformed or the signature doesn't match.
+ pub fn verify(&self, value: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
+ if value.len() < BASE64_DIGEST_LEN {
+ return Err("length of value is <= BASE64_DIGEST_LEN".to_string());
+ }
+
+ // Split [MAC | original-value] into its two parts.
+ let (digest_str, value) = value.split_at(BASE64_DIGEST_LEN);
+ let digest = base64::decode(digest_str).map_err(|_| "bad base64 digest")?;
+
+ // Perform the verification.
+ let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&self.0).expect("good key");
+ mac.update(value.as_bytes());
+ mac.verify(&digest)
+ .map(|_| value.to_string())
+ .map_err(|_| "value did not verify".to_string())
+ }
+} \ No newline at end of file