aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/signed.rs
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMartin Fischer <martin@push-f.com>2021-01-17 19:06:58 +0100
committerMartin Fischer <martin@push-f.com>2021-01-17 20:02:05 +0100
commit61efc35b0a9c62c18a7a98419bf2ddbc0a52a42d (patch)
treeff0ef6604da7b19c0bee5785e93df4844fcc9c17 /src/signed.rs
publishv0.1.0
Diffstat (limited to 'src/signed.rs')
-rw-r--r--src/signed.rs72
1 files changed, 72 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/signed.rs b/src/signed.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f0d184
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/signed.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+// This code was adapted from the cookie crate which does not make the sign and verify functions public
+// forcing the use of CookieJars, which are akward to work with without a high-level framework.
+// Thanks to Sergio Benitez for writing the original code and releasing it under MIT!
+
+use hmac::{Hmac,NewMac,Mac};
+use sha2::Sha256;
+
+const SIGNED_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
+const BASE64_DIGEST_LEN: usize = 44;
+
+/// A convenience wrapper around HMAC.
+pub struct Key (pub [u8; SIGNED_KEY_LEN]);
+
+impl Key {
+ const fn zero() -> Self {
+ Key ( [0; SIGNED_KEY_LEN])
+ }
+
+ /// Attempts to generate signing/encryption keys from a secure, random
+ /// source. Keys are generated nondeterministically. If randomness cannot be
+ /// retrieved from the underlying operating system, returns `None`.
+ pub fn try_generate() -> Option<Key> {
+ use rand::RngCore;
+
+ let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
+ let mut both_keys = [0; SIGNED_KEY_LEN];
+ rng.try_fill_bytes(&mut both_keys).ok()?;
+ Some(Key::from(&both_keys))
+ }
+
+ /// Creates a new Key from a 32 byte cryptographically random string.
+ pub fn from(key: &[u8]) -> Key {
+ if key.len() < SIGNED_KEY_LEN {
+ panic!("bad key length: expected >= 32 bytes, found {}", key.len());
+ }
+
+ let mut output = Key::zero();
+ output.0.copy_from_slice(&key[..SIGNED_KEY_LEN]);
+ output
+ }
+
+ /// Signs the value providing integrity and authenticity.
+ pub fn sign(&self, value: &str) -> String {
+ // Compute HMAC-SHA256 of the cookie's value.
+ let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&self.0).expect("good key");
+ mac.update(value.as_bytes());
+
+ // Cookie's new value is [MAC | original-value].
+ let mut new_value = base64::encode(&mac.finalize().into_bytes());
+ new_value.push_str(value);
+ new_value
+ }
+
+ /// Extracts the value from a string signed with [`Key::sign`].
+ /// Fails if the string is malformed or the signature doesn't match.
+ pub fn verify(&self, value: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
+ if value.len() < BASE64_DIGEST_LEN {
+ return Err("length of value is <= BASE64_DIGEST_LEN".to_string());
+ }
+
+ // Split [MAC | original-value] into its two parts.
+ let (digest_str, value) = value.split_at(BASE64_DIGEST_LEN);
+ let digest = base64::decode(digest_str).map_err(|_| "bad base64 digest")?;
+
+ // Perform the verification.
+ let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&self.0).expect("good key");
+ mac.update(value.as_bytes());
+ mac.verify(&digest)
+ .map(|_| value.to_string())
+ .map_err(|_| "value did not verify".to_string())
+ }
+} \ No newline at end of file