diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/security')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/security/signed.rs | 72 | 
1 files changed, 72 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/security/signed.rs b/src/security/signed.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4da6760 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/security/signed.rs @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +use hmac::{Hmac,NewMac,Mac}; +use sha2::Sha256; + +const SIGNED_KEY_LEN: usize = 32; +const BASE64_DIGEST_LEN: usize = 44; + +/// A convenience wrapper around HMAC. +/// +/// This code was adapted from the [`cookie`] crate which does not make the sign and verify functions public +/// forcing the use of [`CookieJar`](cookie::CookieJar)s, which are akward to work with without a high-level framework. +// Thanks to Sergio Benitez for writing the original code and releasing it under MIT! +pub struct Key (pub [u8; SIGNED_KEY_LEN]); + +impl Key { +    const fn zero() -> Self { +        Key ( [0; SIGNED_KEY_LEN]) +    } + +    /// Attempts to generate signing/encryption keys from a secure, random +    /// source. Keys are generated nondeterministically. If randomness cannot be +    /// retrieved from the underlying operating system, returns `None`. +    pub fn try_generate() -> Option<Key> { +        use rand::RngCore; + +        let mut rng = rand::thread_rng(); +        let mut both_keys = [0; SIGNED_KEY_LEN]; +        rng.try_fill_bytes(&mut both_keys).ok()?; +        Some(Key::from(&both_keys)) +    } + +    /// Creates a new Key from a 32 byte cryptographically random string. +    pub fn from(key: &[u8]) -> Key { +        if key.len() < SIGNED_KEY_LEN { +            panic!("bad key length: expected >= 32 bytes, found {}", key.len()); +        } + +        let mut output = Key::zero(); +        output.0.copy_from_slice(&key[..SIGNED_KEY_LEN]); +        output +    } + +    /// Signs the value providing integrity and authenticity. +    pub fn sign(&self, value: &str) -> String { +        // Compute HMAC-SHA256 of the cookie's value. +        let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&self.0).expect("good key"); +        mac.update(value.as_bytes()); + +        // Cookie's new value is [MAC | original-value]. +        let mut new_value = base64::encode(&mac.finalize().into_bytes()); +        new_value.push_str(value); +        new_value +    } + +    /// Extracts the value from a string signed with [`Key::sign`]. +    /// Fails if the string is malformed or the signature doesn't match. +    pub fn verify(&self, value: &str) -> Result<String, String> { +        if value.len() < BASE64_DIGEST_LEN { +            return Err("length of value is <= BASE64_DIGEST_LEN".to_string()); +        } + +        // Split [MAC | original-value] into its two parts. +        let (digest_str, value) = value.split_at(BASE64_DIGEST_LEN); +        let digest = base64::decode(digest_str).map_err(|_| "bad base64 digest")?; + +        // Perform the verification. +        let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&self.0).expect("good key"); +        mac.update(value.as_bytes()); +        mac.verify(&digest) +            .map(|_| value.to_string()) +            .map_err(|_| "value did not verify".to_string()) +    } +}
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